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 GOVERNANCE OF BULGARIAN FARMING  
 
HRABRIN BACHEV∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This paper employs New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics to ana-
lyze Bulgarian agriculture. It evaluates the efficiency of dominant governing 
forms on the eve of EU accession, and assesses the likely impact of CAP im-
plementation on farming structures. Firstly, assessment is made on the compara-
tive efficiency, complementarily, and sustainability of major farm structures 
such as agro-firms, cooperatives, unregistered and subsistence farms. Next, prin-
cipal modes of land, labor, service, inputs and financial supplies, in addition to 
marketing in different types of commercial farms, are identified and evaluated. 
Finally, a feasible pace for CAP implementation in the Bulgarian condition is 
projected, and the likely impact on farm structures is estimated. 
Keywords: farm structures, efficiency, sustainability, impact of CAP, Bulgaria. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of transition, a specific governing structure has evolved and 
dominates Bulgarian farming: it consists of a huge number of subsistence and 
small farms, the widespread use of (over) integrated and cooperative modes, a 
big reliance on large scale “personal relations”, the domination of “grey” struc-
tures, and poorly functioning formal institutions, etc. (BACHEV 2005).  
The broadly applied “traditional approach” for assessing farm efficiency and 
sustainability focuses on productivity, financial independence, and correspon-
dence to the EU farming model (KANEVA et al., 2005). However, this “institu-
tion-neutral” and “transaction costs-free” framework fails to explain the high 
efficiency and sustainability of dominant, low-productive subsistence and part-
time farming, over-integrated forms and production cooperatives. Moreover, it 
entirely ignores some of the typical forms of governing agrarian and rural activ-
ity such as integral modes, interlinked arrangements, and the great variety of in-
formal forms. Finally, it contributes little towards understanding the feasible 
pace and impact of CAP implementation in the Bulgarian condition.  
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This paper employs New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics to ana-
lyze Bulgarian agriculture, evaluates the efficiency of dominant governing forms 
on the eve of EU accession, and assesses the likely impact of CAP implementa-
tion on farming structures.  
2 THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS APPROACH 
We adapt the New Institutional (Transaction Costs) Economics framework 
(FURUBOTH and RICHTER 1998; NORTH 1990; WILLIAMSON 1996) to assess the 
efficiency and sustainability of governing structures in Bulgarian farming 
(BACHEV 2004; BACHEV 2005). Following this “new” logic, the institutional 
framework and transactions costs are considered as crucial factors that affect 
agent behavior, and organizational and contractual choice. An individual agrar-
ian transaction is turned into a basic unit of analysis. Various market (spot-
light/classical contract), special contractual (private ordering, alliances), inter-
nal (one person farm/firm, cooperation, partnerships), and hybrid forms, are all 
considered as alternative modes of governing transactions. Selection or inven-
tion of a particular arrangement for governing resources and carrying out activi-
ties is regarded as a (transaction) costs minimizing undertaking. 
We analyze the specific factors of transaction costs - institutional (structure of 
formal and informal rights/restrictions, and systems for their enforcement); be-
havioral (agents’ bounded rationality, tendency for opportunism, risk aversion, 
trust, experiences, preferences); dimensional (frequency of transactions between 
partners, uncertainty surrounding transactions, assets specificity/dependency, 
and appropriability); and technological (modernization of production, storage, 
transportation, communication, and enforcement technologies).  
We apply theDiscrete structural analysis and assess the comparative advantages 
and disadvantages of available/feasible forms in terms of capacity to: increase 
transaction benefits; comply with and take advantage of various institutional re-
strictions/opportunities; decrease bounded rationality and uncertainty; improve 
coordination and incentives; control transactions; protect dependent investments 
and (absolute/contracted) rights from possible opportunism; resolve disputes; 
overcome risk; and save current and long-term transacting costs. 
In this paper we take a particular look at two issues. Firstly, we evaluate the effi-
ciency of the dominant forms of farm organization – agro-firms, cooperatives 
and unregistered and subsistence farms. Major modes for governing land supply, 
labor supply, service supply, inputs supply and finance supply, and marketing of 
farm products and services in different type farms are identified and assessed. 
Effective horizontal and vertical farm boundaries are determined by assessing 
their potential to explore technological possibilities (economies of size/scale on 
specific and specialized capital) and maximize benefits of/economize costs on 
transacting.  
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Next, we assess farm sustainability1 though analyzing their potential (incentives, 
ability) for adaptation to an evolving market, institutional, and natural environ-
ment. A feasible pace and extent of CAP implementation in Bulgarian condi-
tions, overall development of the “rules of the game”, and likely prospects for 
organizational modernization are all taken into account.  
This study is based on official and original data collected from the managers of 
2.8 % of all cooperatives, 1.2 % of agro-firms, and 0.3% of unregistered com-
mercial farms, respectively. All farms were selected as representative of the 
main regions of the country. 
3 MODES OF FARM ORGANIZATION  
3.1 Business organizations (Agro-firms) 
According to official data, there are 665,548 farms in Bulgaria, mostly (98.4%) 
designated as Utilized Agricultural Area (UAA) (MFA 2004). Agro-firms are 
registered as Sole traders, Companies, or Partnerships and account for a tiny 
portion of all farms, but concentrate a significant part of total UAA (Table 1). 
These organizations govern a good part of cereals, industrial crops, orchards, 
chickens and pigs and are also a major employer of hired labor in the sector. 
Table 1:  Share of different type of farms in total number of holdings,        
major agrarian resources and productions in Bulgaria 
Indicators Physical 
persons
Coop-
eratives
Sole 
traders
Com-
panies 
Partner-
ships  
Number of holdings with UAA (%) 99.0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.05
Utilized agricultural area (%) 30.3 40.3 11.7 16.1 1.6
Average size (ha) 1.4  592.6 118.8 352.5 126.2
Number of breeders without UAA (%) 96.1 0.2 1.9 1.7 0.1
Workforce (%) 95.5 1.2 0.8 1.4 0.3
Labor input (%) 91.1 4.1 1.4 2.8 0.6
Cereals (%) 26.6 41.8 13.0 17.3 1.3
Industrial crops (%) 20.5 45.1 14.2 18.6 1.6
Fresh vegetables (%) 86.4 4.4 4.2 4.6 0.4
Orchards and vineyards (%) 52.3 29.5 2.9 10.7 4.6
Cattle (%) 90.2 5.1 1.5 2.5 0.7
Sheep (%) 96.0 1.4 0.8 1.0 0.8
Pigs (%) 60.3 1.4 7.0 30.5 0.8
Poultry (%) 56.5 0.2 13.3 29.3 0.7
Source:  MAF, Agricultural Holdings Census in Bulgaria’2003. 
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Agro-firms are commonly large, specialized enterprises averaging 187.6 ha, 
breeding more than 100,000 poultry or 1,000 pigs. Most of these firms were set 
up as family/partnership businesses during the first years of transition by 
younger generation entrepreneurs. Specific management skills and “social” 
status, and a combination of partnership assets (technological knowledge, busi-
ness and other ties, available resources) led to the rapid extension of farms 
through an enormous concentration of (management, ownership) of resources, 
exploration of economy of scale/size, and modernization of enterprises (BACHEV 
2000). Institutional uncertainty, unsettled rights on assets, personal relations and 
“quasi”/entirely integrated modes were extensively used to overcome transaction 
difficulties. Some state companies were taken over by managers and registered 
as shareholdings. Joint ventures with non-agrarian and foreign capital started to 
appear as well. The number of agro-firms has doubled since 2000, and the share 
of UAA has been augmented; they increasingly have incorporate new types of 
activities and organizational schemes, including integration into processing, 
marketing, etc.  
Business farms are profit-oriented organizations, and farmer(s) have great incen-
tives to invest in farm-specific (human, material, intangible) capital because they 
are the sole owners of residual rights (benefits) of the farm. Owners are family 
members or close partners, and internal transaction costs for coordination, deci-
sion-making, and motivation are not high. The organizational style of a firm is 
preferred since it provides the opportunity to overcome coalition difficulties 
(e.g. forming joint ventures with outside capital, disputed ownership rights 
through the court system); to diversify into farm related/independent businesses 
(trade, agro-tourism, processing); to develop firm-specific intangible capital 
(advertisement, brand names, public confidence) and its extension into a daugh-
ter company, trade (sell, licensing), and transfer through generations (inherit-
ing); to overcome existing institutional restrictions (e.g. for direct foreign in-
vestments in farmland and engaging in trade with cereals/vine/dairy); to provide 
explicit rights for taking part in particular types of transactions (export licensing, 
privatization deals, assistance programs).    
Their large size and reputation make business farms preferable partners in inputs 
supply and marketing deals. The recurrence of transactions with “the same part-
ners” is high, which restricts information asymmetry and opportunistic behavior, 
and develops mutual trust and other mechanisms for facilitating (lowing costs 
of) relationships – planning, adjustment and payment modes, guarantee 
schemes, dispute resolution devices, etc. Besides, agro-firms have giant negoti-
ating power and effective economic and political mechanisms to enforce con-
tracts. They also possess great potential to collect market information, search for 
the best partners, use experts and innovation, meet special (collateral) require-
ments and bear the risk and costs of failures. In addition, they could explore 
economy of scale/scope on production and management (e.g. “package” ar-
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rangement of credits for many projects and interlinking inputs supply with 
know-how supply/crediting/marketing). They are also able to invest consider-
able relation-specific capital (information, expertise, reputation, lobbying, brib-
ing) for dealing with funding institutions, agrarian bureaucracy, and market 
agents at national or even international scale.  
Under the conditions of non-working court and contract enforcement systems,  
all critical farm transactions are governed (controlled/protected) through internal 
modes. Farm-specific assets such as critical machinery, vineyards, orchards, 
animals, processing facilities, and adjoining land, are all safeguarded by owner-
ship. Low cost standard (one-season, share rent) lease-in contracts are widely 
used to govern land supply from tens/hundreds of proprietors (Figure 1). Critical 
transactions are integrated through extensive labor employment (Figure 2). Be-
sides, core labor (specialists, mechanists) is hired on a permanent basis and spe-
cial forms such as output-based compensation, interlinking (housing, services), 
social disbursements, paid holidays, etc., are further used to enhance motivation.  
Figure 1:  Governing land supply in Bulgarian farms 
0
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 Unregistered  Cooperatives  Agro-firms
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lands
Owned land in total
land
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lands
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Source: personal interviews with farm managers  
Own supply (making) rather than outside procurement is typical for essential 
services and inputs (Table 2, Table 3) which prevents risk from unilateral de-
pendency (opportunism of supplier) or missing market situation. In the case of 
high asset interdependency (product specificity; quality/quantity dependency) 
with a downstream partner’s reciprocal supply of inputs against, marketing is 
applied. 
Funding is secured through an effective combination of equity, debt, public and 
hybrid modes (Table 4). Standard activities/assets are financed by bank credit 
since it is easy to arrange a loan. Alternatively, farm-specific investments are 
financed through private modes - own sources, “personal” loans and co-
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investment. Also, special contract modes are used to mitigate funding difficul-
ties (e.g. shortage of working capital) or to facilitate mutually-dependent rela-
tions with buyers/suppliers, such as delayed payments for inputs supply (zero 
interest, “loans in kind”), interlinking credit with inputs supply and marketing, 
leasing or accepting outside investment (“hostage taking”, joint ownership) of 
long-term assets.   
Figure 2:  Modes of labor supply in Bulgarian farms 
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%
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Source: personal interviews with farm managers.  
Table 2:       Governing of service supply in Bulgarian farms (% of farms) 
Service type  Modes Unregistered Cooperatives Agro-firms 
Own supply 24 49 65
Own cooperative 5 7 15
Technological 
knowledge and 
advises Market supplier 13 10 25
Own supply 18 85 60Mechanization 
services Own cooperative 22 0 18
 Market supplier 15 15 28
Own supply 40 65 60
Own cooperative 15 7 12
Spreading 
chemicals and 
pesticides Market supplier 12 25 28
Own supply 20 60 40Veterinary ser-
vices Own cooperative 5 0 0
 Market supplier 40 40 60
Source: personal interviews with farm managers.  
In recent years, new opportunities have appeared which stem from preferential 
public programs for agriculture (SAPARD, STA). Agro-firms are especially 
quite successful in developing good proposals, meeting formal requirements, 
dealing with complicated paper work, “arranging” the selection of projects for 
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purchasing machinery, building orchards/vineyards/processing facilities, im-
proving ecological performance, etc. As much as 64% of the projects funded by 
the SAPARD Measure “Investments in agricultural holdings”, were won by 
agro-firms (MAF, 2004). 
In marketing farm output and services, classical trade across the market (whole-
sale market; business with market agents) dominates (Table 5). Since the main 
part of a farm’s product has a standardized (commodity) character, market 
prices/competition effectively govern relations with partners. However, when 
specificity of output to a particular buyer (processor, retailer) is high (technol-
ogy, quality, packaging, time of delivery, origin, site-specificity) then delivery 
contracts with a respective partner are employed to tailor or protect transactions.  
Table 3:     Governing of inputs supply in Bulgarian farms (% of farms) 
Inputs type  Supplier Unregistered Cooperatives Agro-firms
Chemicals Own production 17 0 0
 Own cooperative 10 5 15
 Market supplier 55 95 90
 Buyer of farm output 24 13 33
Own production 47 53 33
Own cooperative 3 15 23
Seeds and 
seedlings 
(crop farms) Market supplier 50 32 45
 Buyer of farm output 4 41 44
Own production 55 65 50
Own cooperative 0 0 35
Market supplier 45 35 15
Forage 
(livestock 
farms) 
Buyer of farm output 9 6 53
Machinery Own production 12 13 0
 Own cooperative 20 17 46
 Market supplier 68 70 54
 Buyer of farm output 15 0 19
Livestock Own production 37 50 28
 Own cooperative 21 31 33
 Market supplier 42 19 39
 Buyer of farm output 40 17 13
Source: personal interviews with farm managers.  
Intra-firm processing and retailing is practiced by some farms. Larger opera-
tional size and frequency of transacting provide an economic opportunity for the 
internal exploration of interdependent assets (farming-processing-retailing). 
Vertical integration helps protect dependent investments and payoffs from mar-
keting processed/retail products, i.e., getting full profit (final products), brand 
name trade, lessened market dependency (easy storage/transportation), etc.  
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Table 4:   Governing of finance supply in Bulgarian farms (% of farms) 
Supplier Type of funding Unregistered Cooperatives Agro-firms 
Own financing Short-term 91 81 79
 Long-term 49 48 55
Relatives and Short-term 31 7 10
friends Long-term 20 0 23
Inputs supplier Short-term 22 27 28
 Long-term 31 23 34
Outside investor Short-term 0 11 13
 Long-term 0 0 17
Farm organization Short-term 13 16 7
 Long-term 14 4 14
Commercial bank Short-term 6 18 38
 Long-term 3 11 23
Short-term 11 56 62Public program 
Long-term 7 19 22
Source: personal interviews with farm managers.  
Table 5:         Governing of marketing in Bulgarian farms (% of farms) 
Output Modes Unregistered Cooperatives Agro-firms 
Grain Own cooperative 9 7 9
 Another farm/firm 50 85 75
 Processor 25 39 37
 Retail 6 7 16
Vegetables Own processing 0 0 15
 Another farm/firm 24 24 35
 Wholesale market 6 5 15
 Processor 38 66 30
 Retail 12 0 6
Own processing 15 7 19Fruits and 
grape Own cooperative 24 7 9
 Another farm/firm 48 39 32
 Wholesale market 0 22 22
 Processor 15 36 25
 Retail 6 0 0
Meat Own processing 0 10 15
 Another farm/firm 65 71 80
 Processor 29 43 30
 Retail 15 36 20
Milk Own processing 0 10 15
 Another farm/firm 42 43 40
 Processor 51 64 45
 Retail 19 0 15
Source: personal interviews with farm managers.  
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3.2 Agricultural Cooperatives 
Cooperatives are the biggest farms in terms of land and labor management (Ta-
ble 1). They concentrate a major part of cereals, oil and forage crops, orchards 
and vineyards, and they are key service providers for their members and for ru-
ral agents.  
More than 3,000 new-type production cooperatives emerged during and after the 
liquidation of old “cooperative” structures between 1992 and 95. BACHEV (2000) 
has demonstrated that the cooperative was the single most effective form of or-
ganization in the absence of settled rights for main agrarian resources and/or in-
herited high interdependence of available assets (restituted farmland, acquired 
individual shares in the actives of old cooperatives, narrow specialization of la-
bor). Moreover, most cooperatives developed along with small-scale and subsis-
tent farming. Namely, the “not-for-profit” character and strong membership 
(rather than market) orientation attracted many households. As for production, 
the co-op was perceived as an effective (cheap, stable) form of supplying highly 
specific individual farm inputs and services (feed for animals; mechanization; 
storage, processing, and marketing of output) and food for households. The co-
operative, rather than other formal collective (firm) forms, has been mostly pre-
ferred. Co-ops were initiated by older generation entrepreneurs and tradition has 
played a role. Besides, this mode allows individuals an easy, low cost entrance 
and exit, thus keeping control over a major resource (land), and “democratic” 
participation in/control over management. In addition, the cooperative form pro-
vides some important tax advantages (exemption from sale transactions with 
members, and received rent in kind) and possibilities for organizing transactions 
that are not legitimate for other modes (e.g. credit supply, marketing, and lobby-
ing nation-wide).  
A larger operational size gives cooperatives a great opportunity for the efficient 
use of labor (teamwork, division and specialization of work), farmland (cultiva-
tion in big consolidated plots, effective crop rotation), and material assets (ex-
ploration of economy of scale/scope of large machinery). In addition, they have 
superior potential to minimize market uncertainty (“risk pooling”, advertise-
ment, storing, integration into processing and marketing), to organize critical 
transactions (accessing credit; negotiating positions in input supply/marketing; 
facilitating land consolidation through lease-in and lease-out deals; technologi-
cal innovations), and to invest in intangible capital (reputation, labels, brand 
names).  
Cooperative activities are not difficult to manage since internal (members) de-
mand for output/services is known and “marketing” secured. In addition, co-ops 
concentrate on a few highly standardized (mass) products with a stable market 
and profitability; all this assists financing, as advance funding of activities 
commissioned by members is commonly practiced, while producing universal 
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commodities is more easily financed by public programs or commercial credit 
(Table 4). Furthermore, co-ops offer low-cost, long-term leasing of land (Figure 
1). That is often coupled with simultaneous lease-out deals as a specific mode 
for cashing co-ops output or facilitating relations between landlord-private 
farms. The integral organization of critical “services” and inputs supply is 
broadly practiced (Table 2, Table 3). Output-based payment of labor is common, 
which restricts opportunism and minimizes internal transaction costs. Besides, 
cooperatives provide employment for members who otherwise would have no 
other job opportunities - housewives, pre- and retired persons. They are prefered 
employers since they offer higher job security, social payments, paid holidays, 
etc. Marketing risky output is governed by effective delivery contracts or inte-
grated into own processing (Table 5). In a situation of “missing markets” in rural 
areas, the cooperative mode is also the single form for organizing certain trans-
actions such as bakeries, retail trade, etc. Given the considerable transacting 
benefits, most of the coop members accept lower than market returns on their 
resources - lower wages, inferior or no rent for land and dividends for shares.  
There have been some adjustments in the size of co-ops, memberships, and pro-
duction structure. A number of them have moved toward corporate (“new gen-
eration”) type governance, applying profit-making goals, closed-membership 
policies and joint-ventures with other organizations. At the same time, coopera-
tives show certain disadvantages as a form for farm organization. A large coali-
tion makes individual/collective management control very difficult (costly), thus 
providing the possibility of mismanagement (on-the-job consumption, unprofit-
able members’ deals). Besides, there are differences in investment preferences of 
the diverse members (old-younger; working-non-working; large-small share-
holders) due to the non-tradable character of cooperative shares (“horizon prob-
lem”). Given the fact that most members are older, small shareholders, and non-
permanent employees, the incentives for long-term investment have been very 
low. Finally, many co-ops fall short when adapting to diversified (service) needs 
of members and exploring potential of inter-cooperative modes. Accordingly, 
co-operatives’ long-term efficiency diminishes considerably in relation to the 
market, contract and partnership modes, and almost 40% of existing co-ops have 
gone bankrupt/ceased to exist in the last 5 years. 
3.3 Small-scale and subsistent farming 
According to various data, subsistent farms comprise 0.64-1.5 million farms, 
accounting for 15% of farmland. More than 97% of livestock holdings are also 
miniature “unprofessional farms” breeding 96% of the country’s goats, 86% of 
its sheep, 78% of the cattle, and 60% of its pigs (MAF 2004). Consequently, a 
significant portion of the entire output of vegetables, fruits, vine and livestock is 
for “self consumption”. According to the Agricultural Holdings Census, less 
than 39% of unregistered farms reportedly sold products, and in more than 50% 
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of the cases, those were surplus, not to be consumed by households 
(AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS CENSUS 2003). Almost 1 million Bulgarians are in-
volved in part-time farming, and use it as a “supplementary” income source 
(MAF, 2004). 
Post-communist agrarian reform has turned most households into owners of 
farmland, livestock, equipment, etc. The internal organization of available fam-
ily resources in one’s own farm was an effective way to overcome great institu-
tional, market, and economic uncertainty and insecurity, and minimize transac-
tion costs (BACHEV 2000). During transition, market/contract trade of household 
capital (land, labor) was either impossible or very expensive due to “missing” 
markets, high uncertainty, risk, asymmetry of information, opportunism in time 
of hardship, little job opportunities and security. Low payoff from outside trade 
(high inflation; non- or delayed payment of pensions, wages, rents) was com-
bined with an increased share of households’ food costs. Therefore, internal or-
ganization was the most effective way of protecting and getting a return on re-
sources and securing a stable income. The long-term tradition of “personal 
plots” and insignificant costs for acquiring specific knowledge (information, 
learning by doing experience) has made developmental costs for one’s own farm 
accessible to everybody. In addition, there has been great uncertainty associated 
with the market supply of basic foods and for many consumers, own production 
has been an effective mode of guaranteeing cheap, stable, safe, and high quality 
products. Internal organization (own farm) is also a preferred/secure mode for 
providing full- or part-time employment for family members. Also, for many, 
farming happened to be a favorable full-time or free-time occupation. 
Unregistered farms are not a unified group and there are highly-commercialized 
small/middle-size enterprises. The latter are mainly specialized in labor-
intensive productions (vegetables, tobacco, vineyards, berries, melons, flowers, 
livestock).  
Unregistered farms are predominately individual or family holdings, and farm 
size is exclusively determined by the available household resources – farmland, 
labor and finance. Internal governing costs are insignificant because transactions 
are between family members (common goals, high confidence, and no cheating 
behavior dominates) or non-existent (one-person farm). A small collective or-
ganization for some activities is also practiced, which allows the partial explora-
tion of economies of scale or makes part-time farming possible (e.g. group pas-
ture of animals, common guarding of yields). This form is cost-effective since 
transactions are not complicated, easily controlled, and between close friends 
and relatives (here mutual trust and self-restriction of opportunism govern rela-
tions).  
Farmers have strong incentives to adapt to market demand and increase produc-
tivity (intensification of work, investments in human/material assets) since they 
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own whole residuals (income). The extension of farms through outside supply of 
labor/services is restricted since directing, monitoring, and disputing costs are 
extremely high in labor-intensive and spatially-dispersed productions. External 
financing of farming via debt, equity sell-off, or public programs have been out 
of reach because of the high costs for preparing project proposals; meeting for-
mal (paper, ownership, co-financing) requirements; arranging funding. Thus, the 
possibility of effective farm enlargement and growth in productivity through 
mechanization, application of chemicals and innovation is limited by small in-
ternal investment capacities (savings, profit). In general, primitive technologies 
and poor environmental and animal welfare standards prevail. As much as 40% 
of surveyed farms report not using essential services at all. Low cost, outside 
land supply (leasing) is practiced by commercial farms to explore economies of 
scale on existing assets. The outside supply of indispensable inputs/services 
(seeds, chemicals, veterinary) is not connected with significant costs since they 
have an occasional and standardized character (low specificity, many suppliers). 
In contrast, highly-specific feed supplies for animals and mechanization services 
are effectively secured through joint ownership modes such as coopera-
tive/group farming.  
“Marketing” of output is not associated with considerable costs for commodity 
and locally-demanded produces – short distance, low volume, high frequency, 
and personal character of transactions. When symmetrical capacity, quality, time 
of delivery, etc. dependency with a buyer (middlemen, processors, retailer, ex-
porters) is in place. then tight marketing or an interlinked arrangement are ap-
plied (marketing against credit/inputs/extension supply). However, a great num-
ber of small farms face marketing difficulties - they are not preferable partners 
for big buyers because of their small volume and less-standardized character of 
output, as well as the impossibility (unaffordable costs) of verifying the quality 
of products though tests, certificates, etc. On the other hand, official wholesale 
markets are inaccessible due to great distances, high fees, requirements for vol-
ume, special preparation, certification. Besides, small farms frequently experi-
ence problems with meeting contractual terms (none or delayed payment), huge 
market price fluctuation, (quasi-) monopolistic situations, missing markets, etc. 
The development of effective collective organizations for risk sharing, price ne-
gotiation, marketing, or lobbying for public support have been difficult because 
of high transaction costs (the free-riding problem), diversified interests of indi-
vidual farmers (old/young; larger or smaller size; specialized/diversified), and 
the mismanagement of emerging organizations. Only tobacco producers, which 
have significant political representation, are an exception. The majority of small 
commercial farms are vulnerable and have poor mechanisms to protect from 
outside institutional, market and natural disturbances. Most of them have little 
ability to meet institutional and market restrictions, bear risks, and safeguard 
against natural/market hazard (buying insurance, diversifying, or cooperating). 
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All these result in significant income variation for individual farms, (sub)sectors, 
and different years.  
4 LIKELY IMPACT OF EU ACCESSION AND CAP IMPLEMENTATION 
Almost two-thirds of surveyed farms indicate they “intend to enlarge their farm 
in future” (91% of firms, 59% of unregistered farms, 46% of cooperatives). Ac-
cording to managers, the highest transaction costs are associated with credit 
supply, marketing, and contract enforcement. Thus, problems with governing 
later transactions are major factors that restrict farm enlargement. For most man-
agers, the “main factors for farm development” relate to improving the institu-
tional environment - guaranteed marketing, enforcement of laws and private 
contracts, macro-economic stability, legislation framework, and access to free 
markets.  
EU accession will introduce and enforce a “new order” (regulations, quality and 
safety standards, protection against market instability, export support) which 
will eventually intensify and increase the efficiency of agrarian transactions. 
Market access will enhance competition and let local farms explore their com-
parative advantages (low costs, high quality, specific produces). Furthermore, 
EU funding, which agriculture will receive from 2007 on, will be 5.1 times 
higher than the overall level of present support for farming. Hence, CAP imple-
mentation would improve funding opportunities, and facilitate farm extension 
and modernization.  
The impact of implementing a “common” policy in Bulgaria would not be like 
other countries because of the specific local priorities (weights), asymmetric im-
plementation and enforcement, the additional support of CAP aspects, and dis-
similar farmers’ involvement and compliance. There will also be “practical” dif-
ficulties in introducing CAP in the public and private sector – information and 
technical deficiencies, lack of administrative staff experience, enormous initial 
costs (registrations, formalizing relations with landlords, preparing projects), 
widespread corruption, etc. Thus, there will be some time lag until “full” CAP 
implementation, with great regional variation that will depend on the pace of 
building effective capacity, and also training administrative staff, farmers, and 
other rural agents.  
A significant portion of Bulgarian farms will start receiving direct payments2. 
Based on the currently low state of support, the direct payments will augment 
                                          
2  Farms will get a single payment according to the amount of UAA: 69-74.20 €/ha in 2007, 
82.8-89.10 €/ha in 2008, and 96.80-104.10 €/ha in 2009. Exact figures will depend on the 
governmental decision on the minimum size of farm eligible for support (between 0.3-1 ha). 
National top-ups could be also added. Thus, 153,640 up to 668,000 farms would benefit from 
support.  
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the level of farm efficiency (increasing/preventing reduction of income). They 
could even induce usage of abandoned lands (eco-conditionality) and provide 
new income in less-favorable regions. However, public support will unevenly 
benefit different farm types, as 3% of farms will touch more than 85% of the 
subsidies. Many effective small-scale operators will receive no or only a tiny 
fraction of the direct payments. Besides, livestock farms will not be eligible for 
support under that scheme. That will foster disparity in income and efficiency 
among different farms and sub-sectors. On the other hand, this mode will sup-
port less productive structures (small-scale, part-time, cooperative farms) and 
non-market forms (subsistence, cooperative farming). As a result, sustainability 
of these farms will increase – small-scale operations will become viable; coop-
eratives will be able to pay rent; subsistence farming will be more profitable. 
Direct payments will increase farmland price/rent, and thus enlarge costs for 
land supply in the largest farms. Small-scale operators will retain entire subsi-
dies and see their income increased. Subsequently, the transformation of land 
management to the most effective forms and restructuring of farms will be de-
layed. Moreover, EU funds will be used effectively to subsidize food self-supply 
of a large part of the population. 
Significant EU funds for rural development will be also available, and will ex-
ceed 4.7 times the current level. These funds will allow more and smaller farms 
to gain access to public support. New measures will finance essential activities 
such as commercialization/diversification of farming, organic farming, maintain-
ing productivity/biodiversity on abandoned farmland, revitalizing mountainous 
agriculture, etc. That will provide new opportunities to extend farms though 
more labor, inputs/service supply, and marketing of new products/services. 
Some cooperatives, group farms, and firms would specialize in new functions 
(environmental preservation, maintenance of farmland) and see their size ex-
panded. 
The CAP will modernize farms structures through widening the variety of con-
tractual and organizational innovations - specific sort of contracts, new types of 
producers associations, spreading vertically-integrated modes, etc. Special forms 
will also emerge, allowing agents to take advantage of large public programs 
that will specialize in project preparation, management, and execution; investing 
in “relations capital” or “negative” entrepreneurship; modes for lobbying and 
representation; coalitions for complying with formal criteria (e.g. minimum size 
of UAA for direct payments, membership requirements for producers’ organiza-
tions), etc.   
The actual system of governance (management, control, assessment) for public 
programs is not likely to change overnight. Therefore, funds will continue to 
benefit the largest structures, more abuses will take place, and CAP support will 
not contribute to diminishing divergence between farms and regions.  
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Some of the terms of specific contracts for the environment and biodiversity 
preservation, respecting animal welfare, keeping tradition, etc., are very diffi-
cult/expensive to enforce and dispute. In Bulgaria, the rate of compliance with 
these standards will be even lower because of the lack of readiness/awareness, 
insufficient control, ineffective court system, domination of “personal” relations 
and bribes. Correspondingly, more farms than otherwise would enroll will par-
ticipate in such schemes (including the biggest polluters and offenders). Besides, 
costs for respecting requirements of agri-environmental programs (expenses/lost 
income) will vary considerably between farms. Keeping in mind the voluntary 
character of most CAP instruments, the biggest polluters and those non-
compliant with quality, agronomic, biodiversity and animal welfare standards 
will simply not participate in them. Moreover, government is less likely to set up 
high performance standards because of the strong internal political pressure and 
possible outside problems with EU control (and sanctions) on compliance. 
Therefore, outcomes from the implementation of such instruments would be less 
than in other countries.  
The CAP will foster the restructuring of commercial farms according to modern 
market, technological, and institutional standards. A large part of agrarian in-
puts, technologies, and outputs will have a “mass” (standardized) character, and 
market transacting will dominate at the farm gates. There will also be a parallel 
tendency toward specialization into productions for “niche markets” and prod-
ucts with special quality (specific origins, special technologies). All that will 
require investments with higher specificity to a particular buyer(s), and “inte-
grated” management of transactions in farming, processing, retailing and export-
ing. Besides, some diversification of enterprises into related activities (trade 
with origins, agro-tourism) for dealing with market risk should be expected. All 
this would bring new, special modes for private governance such as long-term 
contracts, collective agreements (codes of professional behavior), trilateral 
modes (independent third-party certification/control), “quasi” or complete inte-
gration.  
Farming will be increasingly characterized by the domination of larger and 
highly competitive business enterprises, which will concentrate activities in all 
sub-sectors. Large agro-firms will maintain comparative advantages in terms of 
adaptability, governance, and productivity by having greater access to EU mar-
kets and opportunities to benefit from public support and rural development 
programs.    
Most cooperatives will keep/extend their advantages to a large number of petite 
landowners, rural labor, and smaller farms. Besides, they will have greater po-
tential to explore economies of scale/scope on institutionally-determined in-
vestment, adapt to formal requirements for support and use expertise/finance to 
execute projects. That will extend/intensify transactions governed by co-ops. EU 
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support will also provide an opportunity to mitigate the cooperative funding 
problem. Direct payments will allow the extension of activities and offer attrac-
tive rent, while access to investment subsidies will modernize farms. Besides, 
some environmental and rural development projects requiring large collective 
actions would be effectively initiated, coordinated, and carried out by coopera-
tives or mixed modes.  
New institutional restrictions and competition will be connected with decreasing 
the number of small commercial farms (joint ventures, failures, non-market ori-
entation). Most livestock farms will hardly meet the EU (hygiene, quality, vet-
erinary, phito-sanitary, environmental, animal welfare) standards and will have 
to cease commercial activity. At the same time, restructuring a large portion of 
smaller-scale and subsistent farms will not have a positive effect. Changing the 
sustainability of these farms is mostly determined by the overall development of 
the economy, but it is less likely to have immediate progress in non-farm em-
ployment/income. Most subsistent farms have no intention of increasing their 
size because of other major occupations, limits of household demands/resources 
or the advanced age of farmers. Transaction costs to enlarge farms through the 
outside supply of additional land, labor, finance and marketing would be ex-
tremely high (no entrepreneurial capital). Vast costs for studying and respecting 
new institutional restrictions and establishing “relations” with agrarian bureauc-
racy (registrations, certifications, paper works) will also be restrictive. Besides, 
more than 40% of farm managers are older than 65 and more than half of those 
employed are in pre-retirement or retirement age. That puts serious restrictions 
on effective farm adjustment and enlargement (low investment activity and en-
trepreneurship, limited training capacities, no alternative employment opportuni-
ties). For the government, it will be practically impossible to enforce official 
standards in such a huge informal sector of the economy. Moreover, there will 
be strong political pressure to relax the application of EU rules for non-market 
farm transactions (respect voters interests). Thus, massive (semi-)subsistence 
farming will continue to exist in years to come. 
5 CONCLUSION   
The comparative institutional and transaction costs analysis provides insights on 
the evolution, efficiency, and complementarities of farming structures in Bul-
garia. Responding to the specific market, economic, and institutional conditions, 
agrarian agents develop a great variety of effective governing modes – formal, 
informal; market, private, hybrid; simple, complex; uni-, bi-, multilateral; sub-
sistent, member-oriented, commercial, business, etc. Specific boundaries (size) 
of farms cannot be understood with technological determinants but necessitate 
analyses of governance features. Furthermore, the actual efficiency of a particu-
lar mode for land, labor and input supply, financing, marketing, etc., can be 
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properly estimated only by taking into account the total costs for governing a 
farm and household economy. This approach requires giving up traditional 
“production costs” models, uni-sectorality, and uni-diciplinarity; analyzing 
structure and enforcement of de-facto rights; identifying the spectrum of agrar-
ian and rural transacting, and modes for their organization. It also calls for new 
types of microeconomic data and a system of direct/quasi indicators for costs, 
critical attributes, and specific modes of transaction. Finally, this approach lets 
us make more realistic assessments about the prospects of farming development 
and the likely impact of CAP implementation in Bulgarian conditions. Not least 
important is that the Bulgarian model of governance (market-driven, unsup-
ported, over-integrated) could even provide insight on the future of European 
agriculture in the course of the global orientation toward liberalization, specifi-
cation, and diversification. 
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